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[So F. No. 19325. In Bank. Jan. 16, 1958.] 
JOHN F. THORMAN, Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL 
ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES 
AND MOVING PICTURE MACHINE OPERATORS 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA et aI., 
Appellants. 
[1] Labor-lJnions-Membership.-A. labor organization may not 
properly maintain. a closed union and a closed shop at the same 
"time. 
[S] Id.-Bemedies-Jurisdiction.-A. state court has jurisdiction 
to grant both legal and equitable relief in disputes involving 
labor practices in violation of valid state laws where inter-
state commerce is not involved," J,ut may not grant equitable 
relief by way of injunction in controversies involving com-
merce between the states. 
[S] Id.-Remedies-Pleading.-In a proceeding in mandamus to 
compel a local union to admit plaintiff moving picture oper-
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Labor, § 142 et seq.; Am.Jur., Labor, §§ 320, 
556 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Labor, § 20; (2) Labor, §§ 24, 25; 
[3) Labor, 127; [4] Appeal and Error, §125; [5,6,9] Labor, 
124; [7] Labor, §29.5; [8] Damages, §49. 
) 
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ator to membership, an amended complaint wherein it ap-; 
peared only that defendant asserted jurisdiction over moving' 
picture operators and projectionists employed in a city and 
county, that it exercised a monopoly over all employment of 
such operators and projectionists employed in the city and 
county, and that it maintained and enforced clJsed shop agree-
ments with all employers who owned or operated motion 
picture theaters covering the employment of such operators 
and projectionists in the city and county, raised no issue as 
to whether plaintiff's employment was or was not one which 
affected interstate commerce. 
[4] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory as to Issues Pre-
sented.-In a proceeding in mandamus to compel a local union 
to admit plaintiff moving picture operator to membership, the 
union, having failed to raise an issue as to plaintiff's employ-
ment having a substantial effect on interstate commerce or to 
submit evidence in the trial court in proof thereof, is fore-
closed on appeal from asserting it. 
[5] Labor-Remedies-Jurisdiction.-In a proceeding in man-
damus to compel a local union to admit plaintiff moving pic-
ture operator to membership, where the employment involved 
concerned only a theater in a certain city and county, the 
dispute was not one within the cognizance of the National 
Labor Relations Board and the state courts were Dot deprived 
of their jurisdiction to resolve the controversy and award 
equitable relief and damages for tortious conduct. 
[6] ld. - Remedies - Jurisdiction. - Where an experienced and 
qualified moving picture operator has met all lawful and 
reasonable requirements for membership in a local union of 
moving picture and projecting machine operators, mandamus 
is a proper remedy to compel his admission to membership in 
the union. ' 
[7] ld.-Remedies-Damages.-In a proceeding in mandamus to 
compel a local union to admit plaintiff moving picture operator 
to membership, it was proper to award damages based on the 
difference between plaintiff's actual earnings from theater 
employment and the actual earnings of the projectionist who 
replaced him in a certain theater during the period involved, 
disregarding plaintiff's earnings from work other than theater 
work. 
[8) Damages-Attorney Fees.-Attorney fees are not recoverable 
as damages in the absence of contractual, statutory or other 
proper basis therefore. 
[9) Labor-Remedies-Conditions Precedent.-A moving picture 
operator seeking a writ of mandate to compel his admission 
to membership'in a local union was not required to exhaust 
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dicial relief where the trial court found on substantial evi-
dence that, had he attempted to appeal from his rejection of 
membership, it would have been a futile, useless and idle act. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Thomas M.Foley, Judge. 
Modified and affirmed. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel a local union to admit 
plaintiff to membership. Judgment granting writ, modified 
and affirmed. 
Tobriner, Lazarus, Brundage & Neyhart, Mathew O. To-
briner and Irving S. Rosenblatt, Jr., for Appellants. 
Pembroke Gochnauer for Respondent. 
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal by the defendants from a 
judgment granting to the plaintiff a writ of mandate to 
compel his admission to membership in the defendant Loc~ 
162 of the Moving Picture and Projecting Machine Operators 
of the City and County of San Francisco. Damages in the 
sum of $1,289.70 and $1,500 attorney fees were also awarded 
to the plaintiff. 
Local 162 is a member of the International Alliance of 
Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine 
Operators of the United States and Canada. Through con-
tracts with 66 of the 70 motion picture theaters in San Fran-
cisco it controlled working conditions for projectionists and 
machine operators. It limited the number of journeymen 
members to 112 all of whom were regularly employed, and in 
addition dispatched machine operators and projectionists for 
another 175 jobs from the membership of other locals. The 
plaintiff is an experienced and qualified machine operator, 
having been engaged in that work since 1942 except for Army 
service. He is a member of Local B18, a subsidiary of Local 
162. Over and above his dues to 'Local B18, he is required to 
pay a "working fee" to Local 162 in the same amount as its 
journeymen members. However, he is not a member of that 
union, he lacks the security of employment and seniority 
possessed by the members thereof, and has no voice as to its 
organization, its. contracts or working conditions imposed by 
it. 
Prior to the commencement of this action the plaintiff was 
regularly dispatched to work by the officials of Local 162. 
) 
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In Janua111953 he filed with that local his written appliea- . 
tion for journeyman membership accompanied by one-half of 
the initiation fee, as required by its constitution. He was 
notified in writing to take the entrance examination conducted 
by the local. He passed it, filed a doctor's certificate showing 
a good physical condition, and appeared at a regular meeting 
relating to applications for memberships. His application 
failed to receive a favorable two-thirds vote of the members 
voting, as required by the local's constitution, and was re-
jected. The trial court found that the "plaintift meets all 
lawful and reasonable requirements for membership in Local 
162; and that plaintiff has performed each and every act here-
tofore required of him under the constitution and by-laws 
of Loca1162 as a condition precedent to admission to journey! 
men membership therein, save and except said membership 
vote. tt After the rejection of his application Local 162 dis-
patched a newly-admitted journeyman to perform the work 
for which the plaintiff had been regularly employed and ~e 
plaintiff has since then been employed intermittently e1se~ .. 
wh r .' 
[1] The plaintiff contends, and rightly so, that a labor . 
organization may not properly maintain a closed union and. 
eIosed shop at the same time. (James v. Marinship Corp., 25 
Ca1.2d 721 [155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900]; Dotson v. Inter-
Mtional AZliance etc. Employes, 34 Ca1.2d 362 [210 P.2d 5].) 
[2] Furthermore, a reference to the opinion in the case of 
Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Councs'Z, ante, p. 595 
[320 P.2d 473], this day decided, discloses that under pres: 
ent law a state court has jurisdiction to grant both legal and 
equitable relief in disputes involving labor practices in viola! 
tion of valid state laws where interstate commerce is not in~ .. 
volved but may not grant equitable relief by way of injunction 
in controversies involving commerce between the states. The 
plaintiff contends that interstate commerce is not here in-
volved and that the state court therefore has jurisdiction to 
grant both the equitable and legal relief sought by him. . 
[3] Whether the cause of action alleged by the plaintiff is 
one entirely local in character or one also affecting interstate 
commerce must be determined by an examination of the record 
in this case. It appears from the amended complaint that 
the defendant Local 162 asserts ce jurisdiction over moving 
picture operators and projectionists employed in the CitY 
and County of San Francisco, State of California"; that 
Local 162 exercises ce a monoply over all employment in the 
occupation of moving picture machine operators and pr~ 
) 
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jectionists employed in the said City and County," and "does 
possess, maintain and enforce closed shop agreements with all 
the employers who own or operate motion picture theaters 
covering the employment of moving machine operators and 
projectionists in said City and County"; that the plaintiff 
"entered the jurisdiction of Local 162 in February, 1942, 
when he commenced work as a moving picture machine 
operator and projectionist in San Francisco"; that "from 
June, 1951 until June 7, 1953 plaintiff was regularly em-
ployed as a moving picture machine operator and projec-
tionist in the Center Theater in said City and County"; 
that on or about May 22, 1953 defendants notified the plaintiff 
in writing that one Joseph Ford, a member of Local 162, bad 
requested plaintiff's job at the Center Theater and that said 
Ford would take over plaintift"s job at said theater on June 
7, 1953," and that "defendants tbereafter dispatched said 
Ford to said Center Theater on June 7, 1953 in the place and 
stead of plaintift' and the plain tift' was thereby deprived of his 
employment and the right to work in his trade in said City 
and County." 
There is nothing in the foregoing to suggest that the em-
ployment from which the plain tift' was deprived was one 
which aft'ected interstate commerce. Likewise, there is noth-
ing in the answer which in any way raised such an issue 
either by denial or in the allegations of affirmative defenses. 
As the issue was not raised by the pleadings or the proof the 
trial court made no findings of fact as to whether the plain-
tift"s employment was or was not one which affected inter-
state commerce. 
[4] The defendants seek now, for the first time on appeal, 
to show that the plaintiff's employment had a substantial' 
eft'ect on interstate commerce and that thereby the state court 
was deprived of jurisdiction under the rule announced by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in Guss v. Utah 
Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 [77 S.Ct. 598, 1 L.Ed.2d 
601], Amalgamated Mea·t Cutters ·v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 
853 U.S. 20 177 S.Ct. 604, 1 L.Ed.2d 613], and San Diego 
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 853 U.S. 26 [77 S.Ct. 
607, 1 L.Ed.2d 618]. This request would require a factual 
determination which on the present record cannot be made. 
Having failed to raise the issue in the pleadings and to sub-
mit evidence in the trial court in proof thereof, the defendants 
are now foreclosed from asserting it. (Seven Up etc. Co. 'V. 
Grocery etc. Union, 40 Cal.2d 368, 372 [254 P.2d 544, 33 
A.L.R.2d 327].) 
) 
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[6] The fact that the defendant Loca1162 is affiliated with 
the Internatiollal Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and 
Moving Picturr ~t f\Chine Operators of the United States and 
Canada, also a ddendant herein, and presumably might make 
the effect of the limitations imposed on the plaintiff's em-
ployment felt on a nationwide scale is of no consequence. 
The employment involved in the present case concerned only 
the Center Theater in the City and County of San Francisco 
and there is no hint that the business of that employer af-
fected interstate commerce. (See 29 U.S.C.A. § 151, Findings 
and declaration of policy, and § 152, Definitions.) Accord-
ingly the dispute is not one within the cognizance of the 
National Labor Relations Board and the state courts are not 
deprived of their jurisdiction to resolve the controversy and 
to award equitable relief and damages for tortious conduct. 
[6] It is clear that the plaintiff's cause of action falls 
within the principles announced in James v. Marinskip Corp., 
supra, 25 Cal.2d 721, and that mandamus is a proper remedy. 
(Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 37 Cal.2d 134 [231 P.2d 
6, 21 A.L.R.2d 1387]; Dotson v. International Alliance etc. 
Employes, supra, 34 Cal.2d 362.) [7] The defendants claim, 
however, that in determining t.he plaintiff's loss of earnings 
the trial court failed to take into consideration earnings by 
the plaintiff in other than theater employment, and that such 
loss of earnings was based in part on overtime work available 
at the Center Theater whereas the plaintiff's health would not 
have permitted him to perform such work. It appeared that 
the plaintiff had earnings from other than theater work both 
before and after his discharge from the Center Theater. The 
court awarded damages based upon the difference in the 
plaintiff's actual earnings from theater employment and the 
actual earnings of the projectionist who replaced him at the 
Center Theater during the period involved. This was a 
reasonable and proper basis to award damages. (Dotson v. 
Intef"1lation<u Alliance etc. Employes, supra, 34 Ca1.2d 362, 
374; Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 24 Cal.2d 290, 297, 298 [149 
P.2d 177] ; Harris v. National Union etc. Cooks &- Stewards. 
98 Cal.App.2d 733, 738 [221 P.2d 136].) The findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are essentially in accordance with 
the allegations of the amended complaint as to the right to the 
writ of mandate and the award of damages and there is sub-
stantial evidence in support thereof. 
[8] It is claimed that the award for attorney feE'S is not 
recoverable in this case. As tlJere was no contractual, statu-
tory or other proper basis for the award it was therefore im-
) 
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properly made. (Viner v. Untrecht, 26Ca1.2d 261, 272 [158 
P.2d 3}.} 
[9] The defendants also claim that the plaintiff failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies within the defendant 
unions. The trial court found on substantial evidence that had 
the plaintiff attempted to appeal from his rejection of memo 
bership it would have been a "futile, useless and idle act. 
. . ." Accordingly he was not required to pursue such a 
remedy. (Civ. Code, § 3532; Elevator Operators etc. Union 
v. Newman, 80 Ca1.2d 799,809 [186 P.2d I}.) 
The jUdgment is modified by striking therefrom the award 
for attorney fees in the amount of $1,500 and,as so modified, 
is affirmed, with costs to neither party. 
Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J.t concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J .-1 dissent. 
The crucial question in this ease is whether the union is 
committing an unfair labor practice that aftects interstate 
commerce within the meaning of the Labor Management 
Relations Act. If it is, exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the 
National Labor Relations Board. (Garner v. Teamsters etc. 
Union,346 U.S. 485, 501 [74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228}.) Juris· 
diction of the subject matter may not be conferred upon the 
court by the parties (SampseU v. Superior Court, 32 CaL2d 
763, 778, 776 [197 P.2d 739}), and lack of such jurisdiction 
may be raised for the first time on appeal. (Costa v. Banta, 
98 Cal.App.2d 181, 182 [219 P.2d 478}.) In the present case 
the jurisdictional question was not only raised on appeal 
but before, during, and after the trial; and proof was taken 
on that issue. Seven Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Drivers 
Union, 40 Cal.2d 368, 372 [254 P.2d 544, 33 A.L.R.2d 327}, 
is not in point, for there the question of interstate commerce 
was not raised. (See Seven Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Drivers 
Union, ante, p. 625 [320 P.2d 892].) In the present case 
the defendants raised the"issue in a demurrer, which was 
overruled, wherein it was pleaded that the complaint was un· 
certain in that" it cannot be ascertained therefrom: . . . (d) 
Whether or not the closed.shop agreements referred to in 
paragraph V, page 3, line 10, involve theaters engaged in 
interstate or intrastate business, 
"(e) Whether or not the job at Center Theater, referred 
to in paragr~ph XIII, page 10, constitutes employment at a 
theater engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce." 
Furthermore, the trial court permitted defendants to in· 
) 
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troduce evidence over objections by plaintiff that theaterit' 
with which Local 162 has closed-shop contracts were members 
of interstate chains. -The evidence indicated that different 
theaters were members of chains such as Fox West Coast, 
Inter-Mountain Fox, Stanley Werner Theatres (a chain of 
about 200), National Theatres (a chain of about (25), Loew's, 
Incorporated (a chain of about 300), Paramount-Dumont (a 
chain of about 250), and RKO (a chain of about 200). It 
was estimated that 30 per cent of the theaters in San Francisco 
were connected with interstate chains. This evidence was 
undisputed. 
The defendants also submitted proposed amendments to the 
1indings of fact and conclusions of law that "said motion 
pictures theaters are engaged in and affect interstate com· 
merce; that said employers are engaged in commerce within 
the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act . . ." 
and that "sole and exclusive jurisdiction for any claimed un-
lawful activities of Local 162 falls under the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act. . . ." 
The fact that there is no evidence or finding that the Center 
Theater was engaged in interstate commerce does not make 
the action local in nature, for plaintiff could have been dis-
placed from any theater by a member of Local 162 under the 
contracts, and the refusal of Local 162 to dispatch plaintiff 
to suitable employment is a refusal as to all the theaters. 
The discrimination caused by Local 162 applies to all theaters, 
for no theater will hire plaintiff unless he is dispatched by 
Local 162. Moreover, plaintiff's prayer substantiates the in· 
volvement of all theaters, for he prays for a mandatory in-
junction "compelling defendants forthwith to dispatch plain. 
tiff to suitable employment as a moving picture machine 
operator or projectionist within the jurisdiction of Local 
162, " which involves all the theaters in San Francisco, and 
in the alternative for an injunction to prevent defendants 
from interfering with plaintiff's right to employment "at the 
Center Theater in the City and County of San Francisco or 
at any other motion picture theater in said City and County." 
The involvement of all theaters is further emphasized by 
plaintiff in his Supplemental Memorandum wherein he states: 
IC Here the entire controversy is between Thorman and the 
union" and that "he [plaintiff] is not suing to get back a job 
at Center Theater .... " Thus the union's unfair labor 
practice, if any. encompasses all the theaters in San Francisco, 
and plaintiff So alleges. 
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In Oms v. Utah LabQr Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 3, 10 
[77 S.Ct. 598, 1 L.Ed.2d 801], it is stated that by the use of 
the language "affecting commerce" in the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, Congress meant to "reach the full extent 
of its power under the Commerce Clause" even though a "no-
man's land" is created when the National Labor Relations 
Board refuses to exercise jurisdiction and state courts are pre-
cluded from acting. If the effect on commerce is more than 
de minimis, it is covered by the Labor Management Relations 
Act. (National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Building 
&- Oonstruction Trades Oouncil, 341 U.S. 675, 684-685 [71 
S.Ct. 943, 95 L.Ed.2d 1284].) When an unfair labor practice 
affects a single theater that is one of a multistate chain, the 
effect on commerce is sufficient to faU within the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act. (In the Matter of American Federa-
tion of Musicians, Local No. 24, 92 N.L.R.B. 1528, aff'd sub 
nom. Gamble Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations 
Board, 203 F.2d 565; In the Matter of Balaban &- Katz, 87 
N.L.R.B. 1071, 1072.) The sole method by which a state may 
acquire jurisdiction, when interstate commerce is affected, is 
by a cession of jurisdiction under section 10(a) of the Labor 
Management Relations Act (Guss case, supra, 353 U.S. at 9) 
and there is no such cession here. 
Plaintiff's allegations charge an unfair labor practice with-
in the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act, sec-
tion8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. section 158 (b)(2), which reads as 
follows: 
" (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organ-
ization or its agents- . . . 
"(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discrim-
inate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of 
this section or to discriminate against an employee with re-
spect to whom membership in such organization has been 
denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to 
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly re-
quired as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership." 
Subsection (a) (3) refers to discrimination by an employer 
"in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or 
condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization .... " It is obvious that it 
is because of such discrimination resulting from the contracts 
between Local 162 and the theaters that plaintiff seeks relief 
in the courts to compel the union to admit him to membership. 
Numerous similar cases demonstrate that the National Labor 
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Relations Board can not only terminate the unfair labor prac-
tice but order the union to make the plaintiff whole for loss of 
wages. (Radio Officers' Union v. National Labor Relations 
Board, 347 U.S. 17, 54-55 [74 S.Ot. 323, 98 L.Ed. 455] ; Born 
v. Laube, 213 F.2d 407, 409, rehearing denied 214 F.2d 349, 
certiorari denied 348 U.S. ~55 [75 S.Ot. 80, 99 L.Ed. 6741; 
National Labor Relations Board v. Philadelphia Iron 1V orks, 
211 F.2d 937, 943; National Labor Relations Board v. George 
D. A1whter Co., 209 F.2d 273, 276-277; National Labor Rela. 
tions Board v. BeU Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235, 236; Na· 
tiond Labor Relations Board v. International Union, 194 F.2d 
698, 700; National Labor Relations Board v. Kingston Cake 
Co., 191 F.2d 563, 566; Union Starch &; Refining Co. v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, 186 F.2d 1008, 1014.) Other 
state courts in similar cases have refused both injuncth'e and 
compensatory relief on the ground that exclusive jurisdiction 
therefor is vested in the National Labor Relatious Board. 
(Collins v. Merritt-Chapman If SC()tt, 91 Ga.App. 856 [87 
S.E.2d 337, 340]; Sterling v. Local 438, 207 Md. 132 [113 
A.2d 389, 396] ; Real v. Curran, 285 App.Div. 552 [138 N.Y.S. 
2d 809, 812J; Ryan v. Simons, 277 App.Div. 1000 [100 
N.Y.S.2d 18, 19J; Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 
45 Wn.2d 453 [275 P.2d 440, 444-445].) Although Inter-
national Sound Technicians v. Superior Oourt, 141 Oal.App. 
2d 23, 30 [296 P.2d 395], held that the plaintiff need not seck 
relief from the National Labor Relations Board and upheJd 
the state court's jurisdiction to award damages for loss of 
wages, that case is no longer law. State courts may not afford 
a parallel remedy to one the National Labor Relations Board 
is empowered to give; the board's jurisdiction is exclusive. 
(Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Pairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 
U.S. 20, 23; Born v. Laube, I'U-pra, 213 F.2d at 409 j spe dis· 
senting opiniou in Garmon v. San Diego BUtlding Trades 
Oouncil, ante, p. 595 [320 P.2d 473].) 
Plaintiff contends nevertheless that the National Labor 
Relatiolls Board cannot compel the union to admit him to 
membership and that the state court has jurisdiction to grant 
that relief. (Real v. Curran, supra, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 813.) 
It is clear, however, that the board could order the union to 
terminate the unfair labor practice. If the union did so by 
admitting plaintiff to membership, he would receive the very 
relief reqnested. If the union did so by terminating the dis· 
crimination, it would thereby trrminate the closed·shop, and 
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief in the courts of this 
state under James .v. Marinship Corp., 25 Ca1.2d 721, 730 
) 
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[155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 9tJO). In either event plaintiff 
would obtain from the National Labor Relations Board all the 
relief to which he is entitled. 
I would reverse the judgment and remand the case with 
directions to the trial court to dismiss the action for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied February 
13, 1958. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were 
of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
